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Random Notes of an Integration Warrior-
Part 2: A Critical Response to the Hegemonic
"Truth" of Daniel Farber and Suzanna Sherry
John 0. Calmoret
It is apparent on closer study that, while the "official discourse" of
anti-racism is one of universalism, there are various important
subtexts or counter-themes which are used as part of common sense
without stock of their implications for the general model.
-Cathie Lloyd'
Hegemony contributes to or constitutes a form of social cohesion not
through force or coercion, nor necessarily through consent, but most
effectively by way of practices, techniques, and methods whichinfiltrate minds and bodies, cultural practices which cultivate,behaviors and beliefs, tastes, desires, and needs as seemingly
naturally occurring qualities and properties embodied in the psychic
and physical reality ( or "truth") of the human subject.
-Barry Smart 2
t Reef C. Ivey H Research Professor of Law, University of NorthCarolina School of Law at Chapel Hill. I thank Dean Judith Wegner and thelaw school for generous research support. I dedicate this essay to theinspiring memory of A. Leon Higginbotham, a true integration warrior. His
obituary reports that the judge had expressed increasing alarm at what he
viewed as the erosion of hard-won progress on racial issues in the law. Yet, in
speaking to young persons, such as those graduating seniors at WesleyanUniversity in 1996, he said, "I will make two requests of you. They are thatyou always attempt to see those human beings who become invisible to mostpeople, and that you always try to hear the pleas of those persons who,despite their pain and suffering, have become voiceless and forgotten."William Glaberson, A Leon Higginbotham, Jr., Federal Judge, Is Dead at 70,N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1998, at B14. Ironically, he once wrote to me, "with
admiration for your impact and tenacity." The irony is that this, really, is
what so many of us should be saying of him.
1. Cathie Lloyd, Universalism and Difference: The Crisis of Anti-Racismin the UK and France, in RACISM, MODERNITY AND IDENTITY ON THE WESTERNFRONT 222, 237 (Ali Rattansi & Sallie Westwood eds., 1994) [hereinafter
RACISM, MODERNITY AND IDENTITY].
2. Stephen M. Feldman, Principle, History, and Power: The Limits of theFirst Amendment Religion Clauses, 81 IOWA L. REV. 833, 882 n.106 (1996)(book review) (quoting Barry Smart, The Politics of Truth and the Problem of
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As indicated by the epigraphs above, universal dictates
contain unacknowledged subtexts that infuse conventional
wisdom and common sense in ways that can and do adversely
implicate an anti-racism stance. These dictates become
hegemonic in ways that continue to subordinate people of color.
The resultant hegemony glues together a socially cohesive set
of practices, habits, and value orientations in a way that
establishes a collective reality, or "truth." I hope to indicate in
this essay that, in racist ways, this so-called truth operates to
deny humanity to those who are rendered as the racial
grotesque-people of color in the United States.3  This
depiction extends to the scholarship of critical race theory,
which is constructed as a freakish sideshow within the legal
academy. Counter-hegemonic voices are necessarily raised by
the racial grotesque. Thus, in responding to the hegemonic
"truth" of centrist legal scholars, Daniel Farber and Suzanna
Sherry, I join with the counter-hegemonic voices.
This essay responds to their recently published book,
Beyond All Reason: The Radical Assault on Truth in American
Law. 4 In matters of race we must proceed with due care.
Hegemony, in FOUCAULT: A CRITICAL READER 157, 160 (David C. Hoy ed.,
1986)).
3. See generally LEONARD CASSUTO, THE INHUMAN RACE: THE RACIAL
GROTESQUE IN AMERICAN LITERATURE AND CULTURE (1997).
4. DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON: THE
RADICAL ASSAULT ON TRUTH IN AMERICAN LAW (1997). I have responded
previously to some of the views of Farber and Sherry. See generally John 0.
Calmore, Random Notes of an Integration Warrior, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1441
(1997). As I will indicate below, the popular press has reviewed the book
favorably. It has been less well received by the legal academy reviews. See,
e.g., Kathryn Abrams, How To Have a Culture War, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1091,
1115 n.43 (1998) (faulting Farber and Sherry for having "declared victory
without even having waged the war"); Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Book of
Manners: How To Conduct a Conversation on Race--Standing, Imperial
Scholarship, and Beyond, 86 GEO. L.J. 1051, 1054 (1998) (criticizing Farber
and Sherry's reliance on "a string of provocative-sounding quotations,
divorced from context and calculated to make major critical writers sound like
extremists"); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Truth or Consequences? The Inadequacy
of Consequentialist Arguments Against Multicultural Relativism, 15 CONST.
COMM. 185, 191 (1998) (identifying the book's central problem as its focus
"entirely on the rhetorical consequences of radical multiculturalism rather
than on its intellectual merits"); Francis J. Mootz, Between Truth and
Provocation: Reclaiming Reason in American Legal Scholarship, 10 YALE J.L.
& HUMAN. 605, 646 (1998) (noting that Farber and Sherry "fall short of their
stated goal to impeach radical multiculturalism as an expression of an
implausible philosophy that yields dangerous tendencies"). In short, as Peter
Margulies observes, "while Farber and Sherry talk humanist talk, they do not
1590 [Vol. 83:1589
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Farber and Sherry have not done so. Their book, moreover,
has done more harm than they may claim, because it has
furnished the occasion for foreseeable support from various
quarters to reinforce their critique. The voices of support are
virtual echoes that add at least insult to injury and give an air
of common sense to Farber and Sherry's propositions.
In reading the book, I recall the comment of Amiri Baraka:
"not only does the white man oppress the Negro, but he is even
going to tell him how to react under the oppression."5 In this
sense, Farber and Sherry have written quite the officious,
condescending book. I find it awkward to respond to the book
because I am shedding light on something I think should really
be buried. I think that the editors of the current Minnesota
Law Review give their scholarship more attention than it
deserves, making it appear to be more significant and
legitimate than I think it is. But as Gramsci warned, "once
hegemony takes hold in oppositional thought, debate drifts to
tangential issues."6
I am an unapologetic critical race theorist. I have been one
since the initial critical race theory workshop, held at the
University of Wisconsin in 1989. It is a difficult association,
sometimes causing one to live the life of the lightening rod.
While I do not write in defense or explanation of critical race
theory, I think that it is unfairly attacked. I take it personally,
not so much as a critical race theorist, but, rather, as a black
person (human being) who sees such attacks as related to, not
distinct from, a more general disrespect and contempt for the
African-American community, scholarly and otherwise.7
I believe that Daniel Farber and Suzanna Sherry havejoined in that attack, regardless of their disclaimers. I believe
walk the walk." Peter Margulies, Inclusive and Exclusive Virtues: Approaches
to Identity, Merit, and Responsibility in Recent Legal Thought, 46 CATH. U. L.
REV. 1109, 1160 (1997).
5. LE ROI JONES, HOME 151 (1966). Jones is now known as Amiri
Baraka.
6. Camille A. Gear, Note, The Ideology of Domination: Barriers to Client
Autonomy in Legal Ethics Scholarship, 107 YALE L.J. 2473, 2499 (1998).
7. According to Martin Duberman, "[miostly in private, more and more
whites are saying they are fed up with hearing about black grievances, that
everything within reason has been done to improve the lot of African
Americans... that if anything more is to be done, it is up to blacks
themselves to do it: to get the needed education and job skills, to rid their
communities of drugs, crime, teenage pregnancy and welfare loafers." Martin
Duberman, Promised Land, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1997, at 11 (book review).
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that they typify those who fit within the phenomenon, "the
unavoidable conclusion," that conservative black scholar Glenn
Loury describes:
[Ilt is hard to avoid the conclusion that in some influential quarters,
when the object of discussion is the African-American community,
basic principles of decency and of scholarly and journalistic integrity
no longer apply. Blacks seem to be held in such contempt that we
can be slandered, defamed, and insulted without remorse or
consequence. 8
Although Farber and Sherry criticize a generic group, labeled
"radical multiculturalists," the center of their target is the sub-
group of critical race theorists and, among them, particularly
those who are African-American.
Critical race theory has become sort of a moving target, as
it and scholarly allies change various landscapes. 9 This
scholarship is now quite broad-based. As it has evolved, it has
attracted a motley crew, and its body of scholarship is actually
improvisationally incoherent, diffuse, and stunningly eclectic
in both method and message. Critical race theory primarily
investigates how the law contributes to and diminishes racial
subordination. Beyond that, it is harder to identify and, like
rain, its fallout varies in impact. Critical race theory is also
practice. It is conceptual analysis, it is discourse analysis. It is
identity, it is politics. Race is central, but not essentialist. It is
intersectional. 10 There are Latino and Asian scholars who are
enriching and expanding the critical literature as they deal,
inter alia, with issues of racialized immigration, race-ethnicity,
and the effort that presses critical race theory to move beyond
the black-white paradigm."
8. Glenn C. Loury, Perspective on Racism: A Well-Funded Entry in the
Black Inferiority Sweepstakes, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1995, at 5.
9. Kathryn Abrams criticizes Farber and Sherry for, at this late date,
seeking to "bring the legal culture wars to a rapid and conclusive resolution."
Abrams, supra note 4, at 1092. In her view, 'The multiculturalist challenge
has inevitably altered the landscape in which legal scholars think and work.
The question is not how to vanquish it at last but how participants might
begin to speak to each other across the chasms of conceptual pluralism that it
has helped to create." Id. at 1092-93.
10. There are now three major anthologies: CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE
KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT (Kimberl6 Crenshaw et al. eds.,
1995) [hereinafter CRITICAL RACE THEORY]; CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE
CUTTING EDGE (Richard Delgado ed., 1995) [hereinafter THE CUTTING EDGE];
and CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM: A READER (Adrien Katherine Wing ed., 1997).
11. See, e.g., Symposium, LatCrit Theory: Naming and Launching a New
Discourse of Critical Legal Scholarship, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1 (1997);
Symposium in Honor of Neil Gotanda, 4 ASIAN L.J. 1 (1997); Symposium,
[Vol. 83:15891592
1999] RANDOM NOTES 1593
According to Derrick Bell,
[Ciritical race theory is a body of legal scholarship, now about a
decade old, a majority of whose members are both existentially people
of color and ideologically committed to the struggle against racism,
particularly as institutionalized in and by the law.... [Critical race
theory adherents] are highly suspicious of the liberal agenda, distrust
its method, and want to retain what they see as a valuable strain of
egalitarianism which may exist despite, and not because of,
liberalism. 2
The editors of a book on critical race theory's foundational
writings suggest two unifying themes:
The first is to understand how a regime of white supremacy and its
subordination of people of color have been created and maintained in
America, and in particular, to examine the relationship between the
social structure and professed ideals such as "the rule of law" and
"equal protection." The second is a desire not merely to understand
the vexed bond between law and racial power but to change it. The
essays gathered here thus share an ethical commitment to human
liberation-even if we reject conventional notions of what such a
conception means, and though we often disagree among ourselves,
over its specific direction."
As these descriptions indicate, critical race theory is not
nihilistic, not merely deconstructionist. There is a real tension
between modernist optimism and efforts to transform society
and postmodernist, corrosive critique.14 Hence, critical race
theory "seeks in its own way not simply to explicate but also to
intervene in the ideological contestation of race in America and
to create new, oppositionist accounts of race."' 5
Citizenship and Its Discontents: Centering the Immigrant in the International
Imagination, 78 OR. L. REv. 207 (1997).
12. Derrick Bell, Who's Afraid of Critical Race Theory?, 1995 U. ILL. L.
REV. 893, 898-99 (1995). Moreover, according to Bell, "[those critical race
theorists who are white are usually cognizant of and committed to the
overthrow of their own racial privilege." Id. at 898.
13. CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra note 10, at xiii.
14. See, e.g., Gerald Torres, Critical Race Theory: The Decline of the
Universalist Ideal and the Hope of Plural Justice-Some Observations andQuestions of an Emerging Phenomenon, 75 MINN. L. REV. 993, 1002 (1991).
15. CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra note 10, at xiii.
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I. THE "TRUTH" CLAIMS OF FARBER AND SHERRY
Indeed it is at present virtually impossible to write or say anything
on the topic of race that is not in some way objectionable or
embarrassing.
-Dominick LaCapra' 6
Ah, miserable, thou, to whom Truth, in her first tides, bears nothing
but wrecks.
-Herman Melville
7
Farber and Sherry describe the radical assault on truth as
a campaign of scholarship waged by progressive scholars such
as critical race theorists, radical feminists, and scholars
engaged in "queer" or "gay" legal theory. What unites the
group is their rejection of the aspiration to universalism and
objectivity that is the fruit of the European Enlightenment and
their conviction that reality is subjective and socially construct-
ed. 18 The radical multiculturalists seek to advance a shared
ideology-that is, "a set of relatively simple ideas and slogans
that help hold a group together and give it a coherent view of
the world."19
16. Dominick LaCapra, Introduction to THE BOUNDS OF RACE:
PERSPECTIVES ON HEGEMONY AND RESISTANCE 2 (Dominick LaCapra ed.,
1991).
17. LE ROI JONES, TALES 49 (1967) (quoting Melville). See generally
FARAI CHIDEYA, DON'T BELIEVE THE HYPE: FIGHTING CULTURAL
MISINFORMATION ABOUT AFRICAN-AMERICANS (1995).
18. See FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 4, at 5.
19. Farber and Sherry do not intend the term "ideology" to be pejorative.
They acknowledge that "centrists like us have our own ideology." Id. at 9.
Farber and Sherry summarize the fundamental tenets of radical
multiculturalists as follows:
If the modem era begins with the European Enlightenment, the
postmodern era that captivates the radical multiculturalist begins
with its rejection. According to the new radicals, the Enlightenment-
inspired ideas that have previously structured our world, especially
the legal and academic parts of it, are a fraud perpetrated and
perpetuated by white males to consolidate their own power. Those
who disagree are not only blind but bigoted. The Enlightenment's
goal of an objective and reasoned basis for knowledge, merit, truth,
and the like is an impossibility: "objectivity," in the sense of
standards of judgment that transcend individual perspectives, does
not exist. Reason is just another code word for the views of the
privileged. The Enlightenment itself merely replaced one socially
constructed view of reality with another, mistaking power for
knowledge. There is naught but power.
Id. at 33.
1594 [Vol. 83:1589
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Farber and Sherry are amazingly infatuated with the
European Enlightenment, observing that "American consti-
tutional democracy is a product of the Enlightenment-the age
of Jefferson, Madison and Voltaire. The Enlightenment turned
the old hierarchical, authoritarian society on its head,
replacing birthright with merit and talent."20 Their interesting
take on "our" Enlightenment heritage includes the notion that
"[s]uccess is-or at least ought to be-based not on who your
parents were, but on what you know and what you do: on merit
and hard work."21 The occlusion here is stunning. David
Goldberg traces how territorial imperialism, colonization, and
chattel slavery were all instances of Enlightenment-driven
universal merit, reason, and white supremacy. As he says,
"subjugation perhaps properly defines the order of the Enlight-
enment."22 The Enlightenment philosophers, from Locke to
Hume to Kant, saw the African as inherently inferior, lacking a
capacity to reason, and their moral notions of equality remained
intact only through denying blacks "the very condition of their
humanity. 23
I thus have difficulty seeing the age of Jefferson and
Madison as glorious. As Jefferson scholar Charles Miller
notes, "We routinely return to Jefferson and his era in order to
discover the glory of America.... We should also be willing to
return in order to find early evidence of our distress."24 The
problem of racism, however muted and buried by an evolving
sense of the nation doing "the right thing," is still driven by
what was written and lived through Jefferson and Madison as
they extended the Enlightenment heritage to America. No
wonder Ali Rattandi and Sallie Westwood remind us that
"anti-racism has involved in part a struggle over how the uni-
20. Suzanna Sherry & Daniel A. Farber, Beyond All Reason, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis), Feb. 19, 1998, at A19.
21. Id.
22. DAVID THEO GOLDBERG, RACIST CULTURE: PHILOSOPHY AND THE
POLITICS OF MEANING 29 (1993).
23. Id. at 32.
24. David I. Shipler, Jefferson Is America--and America Is Jefferson,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1993, at A17 (quoting Miller). The invention of racism in
the Enlightenment is linked to the defense of slavery and colonialism: "Those
excluded from the domain of knowing, reason, equality and freedom by a
buoyant British and French slavery or an expanding colonialism are rendered
in racist terms as qualitatively different. This identity in essential difference
becomes an 'other', a counter in the making of modem European identity."
THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO THE ENLIGHTENMENT 442-43 (John W. Yolton
et al. eds., 1995).
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versalist humanism of the Enlightenment and liberalisms of
its aftermath can be turned to anti-racist advantage." 25 That
is the challenge that Farber and Sherry so badly fail to meet.
Instead, they chastise those radical law professors who have
been "attacking the Enlightenment and all that it stands for."26
25. Ali Rattansi & Sallie Westwood, Modern Racisms, Racialized
Identifiers, in RACISM, MODERNITY AND IDENTITY, supra note 1, at 1, 9; see
also Joe L. Kincheloe & Shirley R. Steinberg, Addressing the Crisis of
Whiteness: Reconfiguring White Identity in a Pedagogy of Whiteness, in WHITE
REIGN: DEPLOYING WHITENESS IN AMERICA 3, 5 (Joe L. Kincheloe et al. eds.,
1998) (tracing the "positionality" and deployment of whiteness to construct
racial hierarchies to the Enlightenment where "whiteness begins to establish
itself as a norm that represents an authoritative, delimited, and hierarchical
mode of thought").
26. Sherry & Farber, supra note 20. They warn: "Remember, these are
law professors, teaching the next generation of lawyers and leaders ... that
the United States is irredeemably racist and sexist, that there is no objective
way to resolve our differences and that the law is just a tool to achieve
political goals." Id. They sample a few quotations from these grotesque
figures. I offer them as an objective, true-false test. Circle the correct answer:
"If you are black or Mexican, you should flee enlightenment-based
democracies like mad" because "enlightenment-style Western democracy
is... the source of black people's subordination."
-Richard Delgado, University of Colorado law School
[True or False]
Knowledge is "a function of the ability of the powerful to impose their
views."
-Gary Peller, Georgetown Law School
[True or False]
"There is no such thing as intrinsic merit."
-Stanley Fish, Duke Law School
[True or False]
Merit is "affirmative action for white males."
-Catharine Mac~innon, University of Michigan Law School
[True or False]
"'Experienced' and 'qualified' are con words, shiny mirrors that dazzle
the eye. "
-Patricia Williams, Columbia Law School
[True or False]
"Universal notions of merit serve as an important reinforcement of
white privilege."
-John Calmore, University of North Carolina Law School
[True or False]
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Farber and Sherry thus see themselves as intervening in
the cultural wars that have spread from the humanities
departments to the law schools. Indeed, there really is a war
going on in the United States right now, and critical race
theorists are a part of it. From the deployment of oppositional
scholars within a "war of position," the critical race theorists
have armed themselves with a new critical vocabulary, a new
way of thinking, a new morality, and a barrage of new ideas
that have been lodged against the dominant interests of white
supremacy, power, and privilege.27 In response, those who
benefit from the dominant interests have fought back. Farber
and Sherry are simply among those who are fighting back on
behalf of white supremacy, power, and privilege. There is no
way to understand their scholarship outside the context of this
battle. Carter Wilson describes generally how the dominant
group fights back:
The dominant class fights back with its ideology, its morality, its
belief system and its way of thinking. It uses existing culture and
tradition to convince other social groups to accept the existing order
as natural, rational, and legitimate. It depicts alternative orders as
unnatural and irrational. It exploits the values, sensitivities, and
identities of other groups in order to persuade them to support the
present order. If their ideas are refuted and their political position
weakened, they struggle to reformulate their ideology and reinforce
their position.2
This describes the scholarly program and orientation of Farber
and Sherry; it is a remarkable fit.
At first, I thought that Farber and Sherry had simply
stereotyped critical race theorists as "extremists," who had
abandoned not only "moderation," but also "common sense."
Critical race theorists were authors of "childish stories" that
turned out to be anti-Semitic, they distorted discourse, and
they threatened the sound education of law students. Beyond
simple stereotype, however, something deeper is at play in
Farber and Sherry's scholarship. It is related to what Leonard
Criticism of radical theories is "a pathetically poor effort to regain a
position of dominance."
-Derrick Bell, New York University Law School
[True or False]
27. See generally Kimberld Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment:
Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 1331 (1988).
28. CARTER A. WILSON, RACISM: FROM SLAVERY TO ADVANCED
CAPITALISM 24 (1996).
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in this story) as a part of the attempt to dehumanize them.29
Racial objectification is the attempt to convert a person into a
thing, because of the person's race. This remains an attempt
because the thing and the human are really conflated, rather
than either being erased.3 0 So, blacks and other colored people
continually assert their humanity, while whites deny it. One
feature of this dialectic is the linkage between human
objectification with the racial grotesque. In reviewing Farber
and Sherry's book, for instance, David Wagner sympathizes
with their attempt to invite dialogue and their acknowledge-
ment that there is much that is valuable in the work of those
they criticize.31  That acknowledgement, however, is just
"wasted ink," because the radical legal academics are "folks for
whom merit-based hiring is a front for racism, sincere dis-
agreement is impossible, debate is only a maneuver in a
scorched-earth culture war and the personal is the political. 32
In many ways, Farber and Sherry have taken the
humanity out of critical race theory and linked it to the racial
grotesque. According to Cassuto, the thing-human dichotomy
is part of a categorical system and, in terms of cultural
categories, the grotesque is "a social construction rather than
an absolute value."33 As the racial grotesque, critical race
scholars are viewed as freak scholars who are racialized radical
multiculturalists, who emerge from the edges of fundamental
boundaries, who are viewed as the opposite of normal, and who
are to be "shunted off into a corner."34 Farber and Sherry's
rendering of critical race theorists as grotesque explains why I
did not recognize that with which they have been associated in
Farber and Sherry's views. It also explains, however, a
continuing unease among those who attempt this form of
objectification. As Cassuto explains,
29. See generally CASSUTO, supra note 3.
30. See id. at 16.
31. See David Wagner, A Liberal Attack on the Radical Left, WASH.
TIMES, Jan. 7, 1998, at A15 (book review).
32. Id.; see also Robert L. Hayman, Jr., Race and Reason: The Assault on
Critical Race Theory and the Truth About Inequality, 16 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 1, 9
(1998-1999) ("To paraphrase, then, this invitation to dialogue reads roughly as
follows: 'Your methods are irrational, your positions are counter-productive,
your interpretations are wrong, you speak rubbish, and you are, above all,
unreasonable; and oh, I almost forgot to mention, you are also anti-Semitic.
So let's talk.').
33. CASSUTO, supra note 3, at 6.
34 Id. at 8.
1598 [Vol. 83:1589
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The grotesque has a peculiar disruptive power-it is a conflicting
mixture of signals that intrudes upon the desired order of the world.
This idea of disorder is central to the working of the grotesque;
tension is the common element to virtually every definition of the
term. This tension results from anomalousness. That is, the
grotesque is hard to apprehend because it doesn't fit neatly into a
category. This makes it a threat to the entire system. Dracula, for
example, is "undead," a word that is virtually impossible to define,
except as "alive"-which the vampire most assuredly is not.35
Critical race theorists exist within the legal academy as
living within an undefinable state of being that defies
fundamental categorization. Personifying the racial grotesque,
critical race theorists are the embodiment of anomalousness
and taboo, which renders their scholarship as grotesque,
freakish. Farber and Sherry, however, do not desire a dialogue
with Dracula; they intend to destroy him. As Kathryn Abrams
observes,
For all its invocation of rational exchange, Beyond All Reason
does not, in fact, encourage dialogue. It is difficult to find a point of
entry into the authors' discussion or to imagine a response that would
elicit their attention, let alone their respect. The book's argument is
constructed not so much to assess or even engage as to defeat. It
does so by employing a distinctive methodology that carefully defines
both the targets of its attack and the idiosyncratic terms on which
they will be evaluated.3 6
Still, the radical critique that they attack is precisely what
must continue to be waged if the nation is to reflect a more open
society, a society that builds on two important constitutive
elements-social justice and multiracial democracy. Farber
and Sherry's Eurocentric views reinforce a monocultural,
assimilationist ideology that directs exclusion and subordina-
tion on many levels. 37
35. Id.
36. Abrams, supra note 4, at 1098.
37. See Calmore, supra note 4, at 1470-76.
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H. THE CHALLENGE TO THE MOVEMENT FROM
CONVENTIONAL WISDOM AND COMMON SENSE TO
HEGEMONIC TRUTH
[Tihe essence of hegemony is the diffusion throughout society, in its
culture and institutions, of "one concept of reality" that is
perpetuated by, and serves the interests of, the dominant power bloc.
-A. B. Cochran, 11138
ITihe most effective kind of domination takes place when both the
dominant and dominated classes believe that the existing order, with
perhaps some marginal changes, is satisfactory, or at least represents
the most that anyone could expect, because things pretty much have
to be the way they are.
-Robert W. Gordon 3 9
As implied in the introduction, I am writing this essay
from within what Angela Harris characterizes as the tension
between postmodernist critique and modernist optimism. 40
She observes that law professors tend to view postmodernism
as suggesting that that which has been presented in our social-
political and our intellectual traditions as "knowledge,"
"truth," "objectivity," and "reason" are actually something else.
They are really "the effects of a particular form of social power,
the victory of a particular way of representing the world."41 At
the end of the day, they self-present themselves as truth itself.
As the virtue of a knife is its sharpness, the virtue of
postmodernism is its corrosiveness. As Harris says, the deeper
we dig, the more embedded racism seems to be and the more
necessary it seems that one must critique western culture: "By
calling everything taken for granted into question, post-
modernist critique potentially clears the way for alternative
accounts of social reality, including accounts that place racism
at the center of western culture."42
38. A. B. Cochran, HI, We Participate, They Decide: The Real Stakes in
Revising Section 8(A)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act, 16 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 458, 505 n.258 (1995).
39. Robert W. Gordon, New Developments in Legal Theory, in THE
POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 418 (David Kairys ed., rev. ed.
1990).
40. See generally Angela P. Harris, Foreword: The Jurisprudence of
Reconstruction, 82 CAL. L. REV. 741 (1994).
41. Id. at 748 (quoting Gary Peller, Reason and the Mob: The Politics of
Representation, TIKKUN, July/Aug. 1987, at 28, 30).
42. Id. at 749.
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On the other hand, I also claim a modernist orientation
that resembles critical social science, which assumes:
First, that there be a crisis in a social system; second, that this crisis
be at least in part caused by the false consciousness of those
experiencing it; third, that this false consciousness be amenable to
the process of enlightenment... ; and fourth, that such enlightenment
lead to emancipation in which a group, empowered by its new-found
self-understanding, radically alters its social arrangements and
thereby alleviates its suffering.43
This is my continuing relation to the legacy of the civil rights
movement. To the degree I am a deconstructionist, it is similar
to clearing the ground to engage in a reconstructed open and
democratic society and a reformulated concept of social justice."
In my personal view, critical race theory engages in
fundamental criticism as opposed to bit criticism.45
Fundamental criticism is directed toward challenging the
prevailing set of assumptions that the members of society
share to establish the context for their view of the world and
themselves. Much of the conflict over race and multi-
culturalism is a conflict over the context-setting assumptions
that dominant society, institutions, and culture have adopted.
These assumptions are, in turn, rigorously contested by the
oppositional accounts of outsiders, incorporated troublemakers,
and marginalized insiders who argue that those very as-
43. Id. at 751.
44. As Gerald Torres says:
Among the practical problems facing Critical Race Theory... is how
to regulate the conflicting idioms in a way that does not depend upon
a universalizing norm or vision of the good. These theorists need to
reform conceptions of democratic representation in a way that
supports the underlying legitimizing justifications of democracy
without systematically repressing the capacity for minority self-
determination. There must be strong democratic support for group
difference and, from those differences, complex equalities. The
interest group model of representation ... fails in this task. A pure
majoritarian model would also fail where it does not give weight to
culturally specific definitions of the good.
Torres, supra note 14, at 1006-07 (footnote omitted); see also Derek P. Jinks,
Note, Essays in Refusal: Pre-Theoretical Commitments in Postmodern
Anthropology and Critical Race Theory, 107 YALE L.J. 499, 509 (1997) ("In its
modernist moments, CRT is deeply committed to a vision of liberation in the
sense that it aims not to topple the Enlightenment, but to make the
Enlightenment's promises real.").
45. For a previous, more elaborate discussion of fundamental criticism,
see John 0. Calmore, Critical Race Theoy, Archie Shepp, and Fire Music:
Securing an Authentic Intellectual Life in a Multicultural World, 65 S. CAL. L.
REV. 2129, 2135-37 (1992).
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sumptions must be revised. This is characterized as
"fundamental criticism," because it challenges not just bits or
parts that could be changed or reformed within the existing
contextual frame, but, rather, the context itself. Through
contesting the foundational assumptions, the context itself is
potentially transformed by reformulating those very as-
sumptions. The same context cannot remain; it cannot be seen
as capable of adaptation. Bit criticism is a tinkering within.
As people of color are "integrated" within the mainstream, we
tend to personify this kind of systemic tinkering-reinforcing a
feigned flexibility. Bit criticism too often accepts feigned
flexibility, surface change, as something more radical or trans-
formative than it really is. It delays the overall transformation
that is needed to make things just. Hoodwinked liberal agents
of change actually serve to reinforce the social, institutional,
and cultural context-setting assumptions by accepting the
legitimacy of their explanation and justification-their "truth."
Critical race theorists, necessarily, assert a freedom from
the constraints of traditional scholarship. This is not simply a
matter of academic freedom. This is not simply identity
politics. Race-conscious experience and perspective are the
springboard from which we engage in a fundamental criticism
of an oppressive version of truth that tells lies about the
colored past, present, and future. This race-conscious point of
view and fundamentally critical orientation direct our
appreciation that reality is socially constructed and, moreover,
it implores us to engage in counter-hegemonic moves.
From this vantage, the social construction of reality
provides room to challenge what Peter Berger and Thomas
Luckmann call the "conceptual machineries of universe-
maintenance."46  Issues that arise within the conceptual
framework of socially constructed reality and hegemonic truth
are tied to the contestation of universe-maintenance. Race
plays an important part in this and critical race theory brings
that home.47
46. PETER L. BERGER & THOMAs LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION
OF REALITY: A TREATISE IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 104 (1966).
47. See generally Ian F. Haney Lopez, Race, Ethnicity, Erasure: The
Salience of Race to LatCrit Theory, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1143 (1998). Race is
socially constructed, but biology is not irrelevant. What biology signifies leads
to a process of race's formation. As Howard Winant observes, "we can speak
of racial formation as a process precisely because the inherently capricious
and erratic nature of racial categories forces their constant rearticulation and
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Berger and Luckmann argue that the symbolic universe
provides order for the "subjective apprehension of biographical
experience."48 Thus, "objective truth" itself is subject to
fundamental criticism and I perceive a big difference between
my sense of self that identifies me as a scholar who just
happens to be black and one that identifies me as a black
scholar. A conscientious reliance on my experience in this
nation as a black man is crucial to my analysis of the various
machineries of universe-maintenance that Farber and Sherry
so uncritically accept and seek to impose universally. Their
symbolic universe is problematical for me as a black person
(human being). It is not inviting. Let me explain why. It
starts with the recognition that the symbolic universe has both
an ordering and legitimating function. At bottom, its nomic
function, as described by Berger and Luckmann, is to put
"everything in its right place."49 They add:
In this way, the symbolic universe orders and thereby legitimates
everyday roles, priorities, and operating procedures by placing them
sub specie universi, that is, in the context of the most general frame
of reference conceivable.... It can readily be seen how this procedure
provides powerful legitimation for the institutional order as a whole
as well as for particular sectors of it. 5
Farber and Sherry claim that critical race theory has
reduced achievement by Jews to a function of illegitimate
power only. Of course, critical race theory, as a body of
scholarship, makes no such claim. (Indeed, I am unaware of a
single scholarly expression that makes such a claim.) By
distorting the claim of critical race theorists that success is
reduced solely to a function of illegitimate power, moreover,
Farber and Sherry would have one believe that white success
has nothing to do with power holdings and exercises of
privilege that are part of a structured and systemic oppression
of people of color.5' Herein lies a contest over "reality." Again,
reformulation-their social construction-in respect to the changing historical
contexts in which they are invoked." HOwARD WINANT, RACIAL CONDITIONS:
POLITICS, THEORY, AND COMPARISONs 115 (1994).
48. BERGER & LUCKMANN, supra note 46, at 97.
49. Id. at 98.
50. Id. at 99.
51. Moreover, their position would seem to view achievement and success
by Latinos and blacks, who lack power or privilege, as functions of mere
exceptional luck or special favoritism. They also discount benign reasons for
Jewish success. A beneficiary of white privilege is not necessarily evil.
Complicit involvement in oppression is different from active support of
oppression.
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in light of the dominant symbolic universe, as contrasted to
that of the critical race theorists, the problem of power is
certainly implicated as critical race theorists present an
alternative symbolic universe and the advocacy of a different
"reality." The power issue, so casually dismissed by Farber
and Sherry, is "which of the conflicting definitions of reality
will be 'made to stick' in society."52 As Berger and Luckmann
point out, "The appearance of an alternative symbolic universe
poses a threat because its very existence demonstrates
empirically that one's own universe is less than inevitable."5 3
Critical race theory is, at the very least, an impediment to
Farber and Sherry's attempt to drive the inevitability of their
symbolic universe down the throats of people of color.
Critical race theorists, therefore, must challenge the
conventional wisdom that functions as hegemonic truth. Here,
Antonio Gramsci's concept of hegemony is tied to that of the
symbolic universe:
By hegemony Gramsci meant the permeation throughout civil
society-including a whole range of structures and activities like
trade unions, schools, the churches, and the family-of an entire
system of values, attitudes, beliefs, morality, etc. that is in one way
or another supportive of the established order and the class interests
that dominate it.... To the extent that this prevailing consciousness
is internalized by the broad masses, it becomes part of "common
sense."-
Farber and Sherry seek to reinforce a dominant "common
sense" about race in this very sense of hegemony. Only the most
delusional, color-blind, individualistic, assimilated "acceptable
Negro" colored person would accept this without protest.
Moreover, "[flor hegemony to assert itself successfully in
any society ... it must operate in a dualistic manner: as a
'general conception of life' for the masses, and as a 'scholastic
programme' or set of principles which is advanced by a sector
of the intellectuals."55 I do not view Farber and Sherry as
academic free agents. Rather, as well-known, elite white legal
scholars, their interpretative authority is significant. Relying
on that interpretative authority, they endorse significant
52. BERGER & LUCKMANN, supra note 46, at 109.
53. Id. at 108.
54. CARL BOGGS, GRAMScI's MARXISM 39-40 (1976), quoted in David
Kairys, Law and Politics, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 243, 250 n.12 (1984).
55. Id. This explains, in part, why critical race theory simultaneously
emphasizes resistance to dominant truth and the establishment of radical
possibilities of liberation.
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aspects of an oppressive hegemonic truth through their
participation in its "scholastic programme."
Although representing themselves as liberals, though
centrist, with a special empathy for the oppressed because they
are Jewish, Farber and Sherry really write against the liberal
to progressive Jewish tradition. They are apologists for the
very workings of the dominant hegemony and, in this way, they
act as secret agents of a very right-wing racial project. Theirs
is not friendly fire at all, but, rather, enemy fire. Their so-
called invitation to "dialogue" is really a command for the
critical race theorists to "shut up" and "stay in your place."
III. THE INCREDIBLE CHARGES OF RACISM:
THEIRS AND MINE
There is no racism; there is nothing but racism. The issue sends
people scurrying in extremist directions. And thus there is almost no
overlap between opposing views, and little sympathy and
understanding across the lines of political battle.
-Stephen & Abigail ThernstromS6
The newer expanded definitions of racism just do not make much
sense to most whites .... The new meanings make sense to blacks [I
would say people of color generally], who live such experiences in
their bones.
-Bob Blauner 7
As racism mutates and varies over time and space, we can
become entrapped by it as it sneaks up on us in changed dress,
perspective, and articulation. Farber and Sherry make an
incredible claim that critical race theorists, who are so-called
radical multiculturalists, implicitly endorse racism.58 They
fail, however, to recognize their own entrapment by the range
of advanced racisms that plagues not only their good faith and
credibility, but also the significance of their arguments and
text. In their charge that the radical multiculturalists are
anti-Semitic and racist, Farber and Sherry trivialize the ra-
56. STEPHEN THERNSTROM & ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, AMERICA IN BLACK
AND WHITE: ONE NATION INDIVISIBLE 13 (1997).
57. Bob Blauner, Talking Past Each Other: Black and White Languages of
Race, in RACE AND ETHNIC CONFLICT: CONTENDING VIEWS ON PREJUDICE,
DISCRIMINATION, AND ETHNOVIOLENCE 22 (Fred L. Pincus & Howard J.
Ehrlich eds., 2d ed. 1994).
58. See FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 4, at 138.
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cism that afflicts most people of color under the domain of
white supremacy, power, and privilege. They live in a glass
house, so to speak, throwing stones of aversive, symbolic, and
modern forms of racism. 59
One feature of today's advanced racism is "[a] particular
type of ambivalence in which the conflict is between feelings
and beliefs associated with a sincerely egalitarian value system
and unacknowledged negative feelings and beliefs about
blacks."60  This is known as "aversive racism." 6' The
ambivalence that stems from aversive racism is a product of
the assimilation of an egalitarian value system, on one hand,
and contrasting feelings and beliefs associated with a cultural
context of racism that is both historical and contemporary, on
the other hand.62 While studies and conceptual development of
aversive racism have focused on black-white relations, I see it
manifested toward Latinos and Asians as well.
Aversive racists are not dominative racists, not old-
fashioned racists. Instead, "the aversive racist feels
discomfort, uneasiness, disgust, and sometimes fear in the
presence of blacks or of race issues. These feelings tend to
motivate avoidance rather than intentionally aggressive,
destructive, and hostile behaviors directed at blacks."63 I
believe that a lot of racial resentment and negative
stereotyping arises from aversive racism. Farber and Sherry's
racism, however tainted by these features, is not one of
aversion, but, rather, is one of racist engagement. In that
sense, their racism represents a bias for people of color, but
only as long as people of color stay in our place.64 Their conflict
between egalitarian values and anti-nonwhite sentiment lies
right here. Critical race theorists determine their own place.
They do not defer to the voices of white supremacy or privilege.
They won't just stay in their deferential place and, evidently,
this is profoundly upsetting to Farber and Sherry.
59. I have analyzed these forms in the operational context of impediments
to fair housing. See John 0. Calmore, Racelism Lost and Found: The Fair
Housing Act at Thirty, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1067, 1087-92 (1998); see also
JAMES M. JONES, PREJUDICE AND RACISM 124-31 (2d ed. 1997).
60. Samuel L. Gaertner & John F. Dovidio, The Aversive Form of Racism,
in PREJUDICE, DISCRIMINATION AND RACISM 62 (John F. Dovidio & Samuel L.
Gaertner eds., 1986).
61. Id.
62. See id.
63. JONES, supra note 59, at 127-28.
64. See id. at 130.
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Farber and Sherry, additionally, embrace symbolic racism.
Their attitude is "a blend of anti-Black affect and...
traditional American moral values... a form of resistance to
change in the racial status quo based on moral feelings that
Blacks violate such traditional American values as
individualism and self-reliance, the work ethic, obedience, and
discipline."65 While this advanced form is different from old-
fashioned racism, the two are nonetheless correlated in that
both articulate a strong anti-black component. Traditional
values that are rooted in Eurocentrism and the Enlightenment
cloak a racist subtext. Modem racists tend to support four
principles, all of which are implicitly endorsed by Farber and
Sherry. Those principles are:
1. Discrimination is a thing of the past, because blacks
now have the freedom to compete in the marketplace
and enjoy those things they can afford.
2. Blacks are pushing too hard, too fast, and into places
where they are not wanted.
3. These tactics and demands are unfair.
4. Therefore, recent gains are undeserved, and the
institutions are giving blacks more attention and
status than they deserve.66
Moreover, those who have favorably reviewed their book
have also endorsed these views, supporting their case by
citation to the book. Farber and Sherry fit within the stock
denial of modem racists that they are not racists, because (1)
they are not like old-fashioned racists and (2) their beliefs are
factual, universally normative, rational, true, objective, and
meritorious. They are immune to charges of racism, because
they are so camouflaged in their racism that they themselves
cannot even recognize and acknowledge it.67
Let me be clear that Farber and Sherry are not hard-core,
race-hating white supremacists. They are just caught up in a
racism they do not understand. They are not evil, but they are
responsible. This is seen in the commitment to the Enlighten-
ment heritage. As Eurocentric assimilationists, Farber and
Sherry articulate the rankest cultural imperialism and
65. Id. at 124.
66. See id. at 126.
67. With "modem racism," it is difficult to challenge racism by
characterizing it as bad, illegal, or immoral, because modem racists reject the
message as applying to them. See Gaertner & Dovidio, supra note 60, at 85.
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cultural racism. These features of subordination proceed in
lock-step. As cultural imperialists, Farber and Sherry extend
white supremacy by applying dominant, hegemonic meanings
of society to render the particular perspectives of people of
color invisible, while simultaneously stereotyping them as
dangerous, deviant, and inferior. 68 The injustice of cultural
imperialism, then, in society and the academy, is that the
nonwhite group's "own experience and interpretation of social
life finds little expression that touches the dominant culture,
while that same culture imposes on the oppressed group its
experience and interpretation of social life."69 This places
Farber and Sherry in the bad company of others who
participate in racist engagement, such as Stephen and Abigail
Thernstrom, Dinesh D'Souza, and Jim Sleeper. Their so-called
racial realism induces a "race fatigue" and complacency that
shift virtually the exclusive responsibility for overcoming
racism to those who are subordinated by it.70
Cultural imperialism is embedded within cultural racism.
In introducing the concept of cultural racism, James Jones
notes that culture "is the medium in which racial thinking,
racialism, and racialization processes were planted and have
grown."7' Many aspects of the so-called culture wars and the
associated politics of race reflect the continuing dynamics of
that growth, a new racism that grows from the roots of the old.
Traditional values of individual rights and colorblind equality
of opportunity now mask not only persistent anti-black
sentiment, but also growing sexism, xenophobia, heterosexism,
and cultural homogenization.72
The term "culture wars" discounts the significance of what
is at stake. It deflects from the acknowledgement that critical
race theorists are engaged not only in those wars, but also in
the linked racial politics that serve subordinating racial
projects.73 Moreover, as culture is implicated, critical race
68. See IRIS M. YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 58-59
(1990).
69. Id. at 60.
70. Philip Klinkner, The "Racial Realism" Hoax, NATION, Dec. 14, 1998,
at 33.
71. JONES, supra note 59, at 472.
72. See id.
73. See Howard Winant, Racial Formation and Hegemony: Global and
Local Developments, in RACISM, MODERNITY AND IDENTITY, supra note 1, at
266.
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theorists' efforts are necessarily counter-hegemonic battles
against cultural racism. According to Jones:
Cultural racism comprises the cumulative effects of a racialized
worldview, based on belief in essential racial differences that favor
the dominant racial group over others. These effects are suffused
throughout the culture via institutional structures, ideological beliefs,
and personal everyday actions of people in the culture, and these
effects are passed on from generation to generation74
The plague of cultural racism is why critical race theory
must, in response, be insurgently and critically multicultural.
The presence of cultural racism suggests that antiracist
projects--discourse and practice-must proceed on various
fronts that include efforts to renegotiate culture as we also
seek to transform the nation's societal organization to reflect
an open society, to disrupt illegitimate power imbalances, and
to reorient institutional arrangements from their sub-
ordinating ways. It is why those who work for open society,
multiracial democracy, and social justice must distrust the
Farber-Sherry "truth."
Farber and Sherry's critique of the radical multicultural-
ists is an expression of cultural racism. In attacking the
conceptual framework of critical race theory, they further the
"logic of domination" by endorsing an oppressive framework
that, in Karen Warren's view, "explains, justifies, and
maintains the subordination" of people of color.75 Farber and
Sherry's logic of domination is not simply a structure of logic.
It expresses a substantive system of values, providing an
"ethical premise" to "permit or sanction the 'just' subordination
of that which is subordinate.76 Here, Farber and Sherry's
moralizing about "reason," "merit," "objectivity," and "universal
truth" are cited as characteristics that dominant scholars
possess, but the critical race scholars lack.
Like environmental pollution, cultural racism transcends
individual harms and private disputes. As Andrew Kernohan
suggests, "[taken in isolation, the behavior of a solitary racist
is likely to be no more than offensive. But the cumulative
effect of the behavior of many racists will create an oppressive
74. JONES, supra note 59, at 472.
75. ANDREW KERNOHAN, LIBERALISM, EQUALITY, AND CULTURAL
OPRESSION 53 (1998) (quoting Karen J. Warren, The Power and Promise of
Ecological Feminism, in PEOPLE, PENGUINS, AND PLASTIC TREES 214(Christine Pierce & Donald VanDeVeer eds., 1995)).
76. Id-
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culture which crosses a threshold into being harmful."77 This is
an important recognition, because Farber and Sherry are not
merely offensive, but harmful. They pollute the culture by
contributing to racist accumulative harms, harms that are
done by a group to a group and spread over space and time.
The polluting effects of Farber and Sherry's book can be seen in
the views that have been expressed by those who have
endorsed the book. Jeffery Rosen, usually a lucid commenta-
tor, wildly claims that the O.J. Simpson case represents "the
most striking example of the influence of the critical race
theorists" and that Jonnie Cochran's trial strategy was
"applied critical race theory."78 Associating critical race theory
with the acquittal of O.J. Simpson in this fashion is not only
intellectually dishonest, but it is also irresponsibly divisive and
prejudicial. Ironically, he praises Farber and Sherry's book,
observing, "[mlore effectively than any scholars I know, they
remind us of the moral, legal, and political stakes in the
current academic battles between the party of reason and party
of emotionalism and subjectivity."79
The tag "emotional" has often been used to deride black
intellect. Blacks are thus not associated with ideas. In viewing
black art, theatre, music, and intellectual enterprise, blacks
have historically been deemed marginal. As Toni Morrison
observes, "[there's a notion out in the land that there are
human beings that one writes about, and then there are black
people or Indians or some other marginal group. If you write
about the world from that point of view, somehow it's
considered lesser."80
In continuation of Morrison's historical observation, the
nonwhite intellect is suspect and demeaned among those who
support Farber and Sherry. Thus, for instance, Michael Skube
77. Id. at 73.
78. Jeffery Rosen, The Bloods and the Crits, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 9, 1996,
at 27, 27. This association impugns the credibility and competence of
Cochran's ability. As Margaret Russell observes, moreover, "[t]he intolerance
conveyed by such an accusation serves a policing function by warning the
would-be race-card transgressor that his or her complaints of racism will be
interpreted as irrelevant, self-serving, and maliciously advanced." Margaret
M. Russell, Beyond "Sellouts" and "Race Cards": Black Attorneys and the
Straitjacket of Legal Practice, 95 MICH. L. REV. 766, 792 (1997).
79. This is his book jacket endorsement of Beyond All Reason.
80. WiLLIAM M. BANKS, BLACK INTELLECTUALS: RACE AND
RESPONSIBILITY IN AMERICAN LIFE 212 (1996) (quoting interview with Toni
Morrison, in BLACK WOMEN WRITERS AT WORK 121 (Claudia Tate ed., 1983)).
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describes Farber and Sherry's book as "an overdue criticism of
intellectual imposters who once were a lunatic fringe but now
lay siege to the most basic tenets of the Western
Enlightenment.... The authors single out, in particular, the
proponents of what is called critical race theory."81 These
scholars, in his view, are "[clourted and attended to by the best
universities, they retail absurdities that haven't the remotest
connection to jurisprudence but get disproportionate play in
law reviews."8 2 He concludes his review by stating: "When the
truth no longer matters, everything else falls by the wayside
with it, and barbarism wins out."83 (I am not sure if it is
progress for blacks to be characterized as "barbaric" rather
than "savage." What do you think?) Based on reading Farber
and Sherry, Skube picks up their charge of anti-Semitism: "The
Holocaust matters because it did happen, not because someone
imagined it. Yet there are those who deny anything unusual
was going on in those ovens. Would Patricia Williams say it
isn't so important? You wonder."84 This is libelous and Farber
and Sherry need to disassociate themselves from such anti-
black, racist babble. They need to do so as explicitly as they
can and they should do so in the pages of this law review.
William Domnarski characterizes the Farber-Sherry
critique of radical multiculturalists as "admittedly harsh"-but
"only because it is so effective at exposing the looniness of the
movement and its advocates."85 Relying on Farber and Sherry,
he reinforces their suggestion that radical multiculturalists
"present dangers to the social fabric, in part because they, like
true totalitarians, want to silence their opposition."86 Such
scholars represent "all that is wrong with the legal academy
and what passes these days as scholarly writing."87
These reactions generated by Farber and Sherry extend to
Richard Posner, who also endorses their engaged racism. Mind
you, Posner is the Chief Judge of the United States Court of
81. Michael Skube, Law's Radical Academics Get Thrashing They
Deserve, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Nov. 16, 1997, at L12 (emphasis added).
82. Id.
83. Id. (emphasis added).
84. Id.
85. William Domnarski, An Academic Theory Threatens the Foundations
of the Law, Authors Say, 143 CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Oct. 21, 1997, at 3
(emphasis added).
86. Id. (emphasis added).
87. Id.
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Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and the Senior Lecturer at the
University of Chicago Law School. However racist and goofy,
his words count. He characterizes the so-called multicultural-
ists as an intellectual movement that "is distinguished by
having a rational fringe and a lunatic core."88 Under Posner's
dominant gaze, people of color who are critical race theorists
are not only lunatics, but they seem to lack some of "the
necessaries" to be intellectuals and scholars. In deference to
his intellectual status among the bench and bar as well as the
legal academy, I quote Judge Posner at length:
What is most arresting about critical race theory is that, as
Farber and Sherry amply document, it turns its back on the Western
tradition of rational inquiry, forswearing analysis for narrative.
Rather than marshal logical arguments and empirical data, critical
race theorists tell stories-fictional, science-fictional, quasi-fictional,
autobiographical, anecdotal-designed to expose the pervasive and
debilitating racism of America today. By repudiating reasoned
argumentation, the storytellers reinforce stereotypes about the
intellectual capacities of nonwhites.... Since [probably meaning
"because"] they do not have literary skills, they cannot excuse their
turn to narratives by claiming merely to be better storytellers than
analysts.
The ironic consequence is that the critical race theorists are poor
role models. Instead of exemplifying in their careers the potential of
members of their groups for respected achievement in the world
outside the ghetto of complaint-the kind of exemplification that we
find in the career of Colin Powell-critical race theorists teach by
example that the role of a member of a minority group is to be paid a
comfortable professional salary to write childish stories about how
awful it is to be a member of such a group.
[Critical race theorists] come across as labile and
intellectually limited ... divisive... [and] their suggested cures
(rigid quotas, 1960s-style demonstrations, transformations of the
American spirit, socialism, poverty law practice) [poverty law?] are
tried and true failures. Their lodgment in the law schools is a
88. Richard A. Posner, The Skin Trade, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 13, 1997, at
40, 43 (book review). Who's who? Critical race theorists-such as Derrick
Bell, Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Jerome Culp, Richard Delgado, Alex Johnson, Mari
Matsuda and Patricia Williams-personify the all-colored lunatic core, and
the rational fringe is all-white-Michael Foucault, Stanley Fish, Duncan
Kennedy, and Catherine MacKinnon. Posner does, however, seem to
characterize Richard Delgado as white. He ridicules Delgado for claiming to
belong to a group he calls "people of color." He says, "I have met Professor
Delgado. He is as pale as I am, has sharply etched features in a long face,
speaks unaccented English, and, for all that appears upon casual
acquaintance, could be a direct descendant of Ferdinand and Isabella." Id. at
41.
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disgrace to legal education, which lacks the moral courage and the
intellectual self-confidence to pronounce a minority movement's
scholarship bunk. 89
Talk about the grotesque! Is this a kinder, gentler bell-curve
thesis? This assessment is remarkable, not just in text but in
authorship. For many of the public, this is the authoritative
interpretative assessment of critical race theory. Farber and
Sherry have presented the occasion for Posner to present his
version of engaged racism.
It goes to show you that there is a thin line between
today's aversive, symbolic, and modem racism and the old-
fashioned racism of naked white supremacy. It's hard to fight
back, however, when you are reduced to reckless, paranoid
totalitarians who are irrational, labile, intellectually suspect,
bad role models, unsuitable to teach or write-so grotesque.
Fire music, where are you when I need you?
IV. CRITICAL RACE ATTITUDE: THE JAZZ CONNECTION
I'd rather hear Louis Armstong play "Tiger Rag" than wander into
Westminster Abbey and find the lost chord.
-Edward, Duke of Windsor
I agree with that.
-Louis Armstrong
Like jazz music, critical race theory tends "to make the
familiar strange and the strange familiar. 91 It strikes me that
jazz belongs in this essay, because for those who can dig it, jazz
is an open-society music, an expression of freedom and
multicultural bridge-building. For those who can't dig it, it is a
radical assault on truth. Jazz music has a hip attitude,
technique, and sound. Thus, in speaking appreciatively of
Ornette Coleman's music, Gary Giddins says that it "hits me in
89. Id. at 41-42.
90. This pair of complementary epigraphs appears in Gary Giddins'
wonderful book celebrating jazz's first century. GARRY GIDDINS, VISIONS OF
JAZZ: THE FIRST CENTURY 83 (1998).
91. Peggy Davis described critical race theory in these words at an early
annual workshop. It remains the case today. In discussing the erosion of
classic norms in anthropology, Renato Rosaldo makes a similar observation,
stating that "[in presenting culture as a subject for analysis and critique, the
ethnographic perspective develops an interplay between making the familiar
strange and the strange familiar." RENATO ROSALDO, CULTURE AND TRUTH:
THE REMAKING OF SOCIAL ANALYSIS 39 (1989).
19991 1613
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
unprotected areas of the brain."92 Jazz requires more than just
listening. For instance, Giddins tells of George Russell
learning that Coleman did not count off tempos. The
astonished Russell asked, "How did that work?" "Insight" was
Coleman's answer.93 Finally, Giddins also describes a solo
played by Archie Shepp as "granite talking."94 Critical race
theory, too, intrudes into unprotected areas of the brain,
attempts to bring cross-cultural insight without counting
tempos, and continues in the rock-steady voice of granite
talking.
To appreciate both jazz and critical race theory, one must
be open and intellectually curious in ways that Eurocentric,
assimilationist dictates frustrate. One certainly cannot
assume that one has a conceptual corner on the market of
"truth," "value," and "reason." Playing against this tendency,
jazz musicians are strong-willed and committed to their art in
unshakable ways. Over the century, jazz has persisted against
the odds and despite popular apathy, misunderstandings, and
harsh critique. Like critical race theory, people have always
messed with it without even getting it. In many ways jazz and
critical race theory are coherent and not at the same time. As
Ornette Coleman observes, "[y]ou can be in unison without
being in unison.95
John Coltrane personifies a giant in jazz, but in 1961 he
took off in directions that invented a heavier music than his
time could handle. His saxophone playing represented a
yearning for a new world.96 Critical race theorists also yearn
for a new world and, like Coltrane, we are misunderstood and
mischaracterized. Jazz critics labeled Coltrane's new sounds
as "musical nonsense" and "anti-jazz."97 Today, there is a
critical consensus that these sounds were brilliant in pushing
the art to more profound depth and breadth. But during its
initial offering, critics rejected it out of hand, characterizing it
as "in effect, an extended cadenza to a piece that never gets
played," "one big airleak," "one of the noblest failures on
record."98 In the final analysis, however, "Coltrane altered the
92. GIDDINS, supra note 90, at 469.
93. Id. at 470.
94. Id. at 487.
95. Id. at 469.
96. See id. at 476.
97. Id. at 477.
98. Id.
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flavor of jazz. He didn't force a comprehensive retooling of the
music, as Armstrong and Parker did, but he instigated a
reimagining of possibilities and brought back a solemnity of
purpose that shook up the old order."99 In other words, a
radical assault on truth is not necessarily a bad thing.
Coltrane is known for his extended blowing. According to
Coltrane, "the main thing a musician would like to do is to give
a picture to the listener of the many wonderful things he knows
of and senses in the universe."'100 When Miles asked him why
he played such long solos, Coltrane answered: "It took that long
to get it all in."10' Seeking justice involves long-haul work,
extended blowing, if you will. As multiculturalists who seek
social justice and an open society we know what Coltrane
meant. That is why we chase the Trane.
I have mixed emotions as the larger culture comes to
appreciate jazz, for often African-American culture has either
been denigrated or misappropriated. One aspect of this so-
called appreciation is found in the use of jazz by advertisers.I02
Explanations among advertisers vary. Some see jazz as "fresh"
and "break[ing] through the clutter."'0 3 As I claim, jazz is
open-society music and this feature makes it attractive to
advertisers. A survey determined that the primary audience ofjazz listeners is "racially diverse, made up of 35- to 49-year-old
college graduates who earned at least $75,000 a year."' 04
Among those surveyed, some 40 percent said "they either
owned or planned to buy a luxury car or sport utility vehicle
within the next year."'0 5 Jazz appeals to this group, because
"[blottom line, jazz has integrity," says Eric Korte, the music
director at the advertising agency Saatchi & Saatchi. He adds,
"It's never corny. It moves. And its percussive quality, its
energy, livens up anything connected with it."106
In speaking before various student groups and in teaching
a seminar on critical race theory, I see a similar openness to
99. Id. at 489 (emphasis added).
100. Id. at 490.
101. Id.
102. See Valerie Gladstone, Advertisers Play a New Tune: Jazz, N.Y.
TIMEs, Dec. 6, 1998, at 34.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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critical race theory. 07  Its percussive quality is freedom
drumming and its energy is enough for the long haul. I'm not
really bothered that Farber and Sherry are not buying it. As
Giddins says, "The most neglected component of a successful
concert is a good audience." 08 It really is okay that Farber and
Sherry are not happily within that audience. Perhaps Farber
and Sherry are as out of step as those who once observed of
jazz: "Jazz is the expression of protest against law and order,
the bolshevik element of license striving for expression in
music." "What a terrible revenge by the culture of Negroes on
that of the whites!" "Jazz opposes to our classical conception of
music a strange and subversive chaos of sounds ... it is a
fashion and, as such, destined some day to disappear."109
I continue to find inspiration in jazz, because the music
has resiliency, it has attitude, and its artists keep their own
counsel. Think, as examples, of Billie Holiday, Miles Davis,
Charlie Parker, Thelonius Monk, Abbey Lincoln, Archie Shepp,
Cecil Taylor, Max Roach, Sarah Vaughn, John Coltrane,
Ornette Coleman, Dizzie Gillespie, and Charles Mingus.
Would they be bothered by critiques from the likes of Farber
and Sherry? Would they defiantly continue to play and sing
their music and be themselves?
CONCLUSION
David Shipler concludes from his extensive interviews
with African-Americans that
distrust is a major obstacle to black-white friendships. It is the
fault beneath the fragile common ground. It results from all that has
gone before: the images of immortality, the hurtful expectations, and
the pain of real experiences, which undermine the belief that virtue
can exist across the racial line.110
I may be wrong, but I do not see how Farber and Sherry's book
and related writings can help to improve this situation. I am
not really concerned about friendship, but I am concerned
107. See John 0. Calmore, Close Encounters of the Racial Kind:
Pedagogical Reflections and Seminar Conversations, 31 U.S.F. L. REV. 903
(1997).
108. GEDDINS, supra note 90, at 509.
109. Id. at an unpaginated epigraph page preceding the table of contents
(quoting Anne Shaw Faulkner, Ignace Paderewski, and Igor Stravinski,
respectively).
110. DAVID K. SHIPLER, A COUNTRY OF STRANGERS: BLACKS AND WHITES
IN AMERICA 346 (1997).
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about the prospects for believing that virtue can exist across
the racial line. Regardless of vantage point, one cannot be
sure. So much depends on good faith. Perhaps most troubling
about the Farber-Sherry view is that I do not see good faith
there. I could be wrong, but there is just too much bad,
"unavoidable conclusion" stuff in their writing.I'1 The picture
they paint is just not right. In the words of Pat Williams:
Stop. What's wrong with this picture? Could we get a grip forjust a moment? Critical Race Theory is a zero-budget, peripatetic,
more-or-less-annual conference, not a conspiracy. It is by no means a
"black" movement, even if you think "race" excludes those who call
themselves "white."...
Far from taking over legal academia, only about 11 percent of full-
time law professors are minorities of any stripe, and only a tiny
subgroup of those have ever produced scholarship that has anything
at all to do with race....
The recent flurry of attacks on Critical Race Theory... share a
number of troubling features. One is that they take a fluidly left-
leaning group and depict it as an idiotically "separatist," right-wing
monolith. This "why did you beat your wife" strategy means that real
debate of issues posed by a serious, responsible left is eternally
circumvented as we sacrifice precious time to the kind of simple-
minded but necessary refutation that only sets you up for more: I am
not a neo-Nazi! I can so tell the difference between fantasy and fact!
And of course, Some of my best friends are white!"2
In closing this essay, let me acknowledge that I am privi-
leged and I do not take it for granted. I have been fortunate to
have numerous opportunities to engage in sustained
collaboration and work with people across color lines, both
within and beyond the black-white paradigm: from practicing
law as a Legal Services attorney to serving on community
boards, from teaching law students to chairing the Board of
Directors of the New World Foundation and serving on the
Board of Directors of the National Asian Pacific American
Legal Consortium. Experiences such as these have established
a broader, deeper appreciation for humanity and the sense that
this precious humanity is what links us and inspires us.
Blacks and whites assume familiarity with each other,
even though we really tend not to know each other well. The
assumed familiarity really blocks the attempt to appreciate our
common humanity. The history of conflict preempts the future
111. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (discussing comments of
Glenn Loury).
112. Patricia J. Williams, De Jure, De Facto, De Media, NATION, June 2,
1997, at 10.
1999] 1617
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
of collaboration. It causes us to forget, or discount, the common
enterprises we have furthered, from the inspiring Olympic
Games to the depressing wars. Our mutual suspicions,
threats, and fears seem inevitable, though they are not. With
the increasing numbers of Asians and Latinos now in the
United States, there is a wonderful opportunity to step outside
of what we know and how we have come to know our "truths"
about race/ism. We really have a new chance to solidify and
broaden the human connection. At least that has been my
experience.
Thus, my varied experiences as a practicing multicultural-
ist convince me that the multicultural future is viable. Social
justice can be reflected in the make-up and operation of a more
open society and democracy. Justice can be experienced, day
by day, even among those who now might least expect it. This,
however, is long-haul work. At that work, enemies will be
made and disagreement among friends will occur. It just goes
with the territory; it is part of the serious business being
conducted. It is worth the effort.
Finally, I have come to identify with Georgia Congressman
John Lewis, a courageous integration warrior. Recently Paul
Begala, an advisor to President Clinton, described how he grew
up in the suburbs as a privileged white man and how he came
to view Congressman Lewis as his civil rights hero. In
responding to why he was not better-known, Congressman
Lewis remarked: "I'm more like a pilot light than a firecracker.
I burn low, but I burn long and strong. I don't just pop off then
go away."1 3 As with all who struggle for social justice, for an
open society, and for a multiracial democracy, I hope that we
hard-core integration warriors and social justice workers,
regardless of our color, gender, or sexual orientation will stay
the course and sustain the struggle. I hope, then, that we will
continue to be pilot lights who will burn long and strong. Most
importantly, as this essay suggests, I hope we will not let
others reduce us to firecrackers who merely pop off and then go
away.
113. What is a Hero?, ESQUIRE, Nov. 1998, at 104, 108.
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